Abstract
Prior to the events now remembered as the Arab Spring, Jordan was frequently classified as a 'hybrid regime. ' 1 The Hashemite Kingdom was deemed an 'authoritarian monarchy,' 'liberal autocracy' or 'pseudo-democracy,' never quite fitting neatly into the typologies so beloved in the democratization literature. 2 Along with Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia, Jordan adopted various formal institutions commonly associated with liberal
democracy, yet to little avail. Monarchical rule persisted, although its institutional façade was transformed. Today, the Hashemite Kingdom is frequently praised as a paragon of stability and prudent reform. Continuity in rule and minimal social unrest offer a soothing contrast to the chaos that engulfs its neighbors. Foreign allies praise the country's king, international organizations commend the regime's commitment to democratization, while many Jordanian politicians accept the limits placed on participation as prudent and necessary. 3 The intermittent external pressures to democratize have faded; the fluctuations of geopolitics have downgraded the importance of political reform. As one prominent Washington commentator stated recently, 'the survival of the Hashemite regime is a U.S. strategic imperative.' 4 The perils of regional instability, rising extremism and an untrustworthy opposition make public participation appear an unwarranted risk. emphasize the Hashemite regime's commitment to political reform to audiences at home and abroad. King Abdullah II is an expert in this regard. An authoritarian incumbent who quickly learned the vocabulary of international expectations, he has fully adopted the rhetoric of democratization. 5 In addition to generating foreign support for the monarchy, this rhetoric has been a key weapon in the Palace's domestic political arsenal; it functions as the never-ending soundtrack of Jordanian politics. Taken at face value, the monarchy appears not only interested but also committed to implementing free and fair elections, a multi-party system and representative parliamentary government. As Schwedler points out, 'these concepts are often left poorly defined, though they are frequently invoked.' 6 Despite this conceptual ambiguity, key actors exert considerable and consistent effort to publicize the regime's democratizing pretensions. Yet still, Jordanian politics is rarely pondered in relation to these non-institutional forms of power. The discursive features of authoritarianism receive short thrift.
To remedy this lacuna, this article explores the monarchy's portrayal of partisan life in Jordan to illustrate how it shapes one key political debate in the country. It draws upon Laclau and Mouffe's theory of discourse, defined as a horizon of 'multifarious practices, meanings and conventions…through which a certain sense of reality and understanding of society are constituted,' 7 to scrutinize the power relations and strategies through which the Hashemite regime attempts to fix meaning within a particular domain.
Specifically, it examines the articulation of a key nodal point (democracy) that provisionally binds together a particular web of meanings and privileged signifiers (political parties, reform and opposition) at the heart of the monarchy's legitimating discourse. 8 It does so through a heuristic analysis of the Palace's depiction of partisan life and opposition politics so as to explore the persistent assumptions, themes and vocabularies that shape, enable and constrain the country's political reform debate. I
follow Andrea Teti's call to approach democratization as a discourse and a category of action in its own right by focusing on the 'processes through which what counts as knowledge is produced and deployed in policy-making and practice.' elements of political reform and partisan life were discussed (party capacity building, electoral laws, decentralization). This allowed a more detailed understanding of Jordanian party politics from the perspective of its key participants. In addition, I compiled introductory university textbooks in history, civics and politics and official Palace documents (speeches, press releases, working papers) to re-construct the official position.
This combination helped capture the regime's portrayal of democratization, trace the mechanisms for its diffusion while analyzing its impact. The article will argue that narratives emphasizing party weakness or extremism work to make Jordan appear as simply not ready for parliamentary democracy. These tropes are more than just an ideology meant to foster false consciousness or acquiesce foreign donors; they comprise a set of 'practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak.' 10 Party weakness and extremism are, in many respects, a self-fulfilling prophecy.
The article proceeds in four parts. It begins by outlining the contours of hegemonic depictions of Jordanian political parties before assessing prevalent methods used to study these dynamics. I critique the democratization literature's consistent disregard for non-institutional forms of power, a form of 'statolatry' that views the state as a fixed entity whose actions and effects are limited to formal institutions. 11 The following section summarizes Jordanian political reforms and developments since 1989.
The third section dissects regime-sponsored rhetoric regarding Jordan's political parties.
It outlines both their deployment by authoritarian elites as well as their adoption by key local and foreign actors. The essay concludes by expanding on its main theoretical and empirical insights, teasing out the importance of discursive practices to autocratic rule. second key characteristic of the new electoral system was the purposeful gerrymandering of districts. It favored rural areas and southern towns considered bastions of monarchical support, whom were given a ratio of seats-to-voters far higher than urban areas traditionally linked to opposition currents. 44 The new electoral formula all but ensured the disproportionate representation of loyalist candidates and affluent tribal leaders invested in the status quo. 45 Voting patterns in 1993 confirmed the supremacy of geographic considerations and those tied to them: kin, tribe and region. 46 Palace-designed institutional policies ensured that parliamentary life would re-enforce the logics unleashed at the polls.
Stripped of its ability to contest public policies deemed crucial to the monarchy, the Lower House quickly became a crucial cog in the regime's distribution of patronage to loyal legislators and constituencies. Given budget cuts, fiscal austerity and unequally distributed economic growth, candidates perceived to be capable of channeling funds from a diminishing pool of government resources were increasingly valued.
Parliamentary elections became exercises in 'competitive clientelism,' where nominees vie for access to public resources and to act as intermediaries in patronage networks.
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They were a classic example of the 'tragic brilliance' typical of many authoritarian regimes, where citizens' choices are relatively free, 'yet they are constrained by a series of strategic dilemmas that compel them to remain loyal to the regime.' in popular mobilization and governance are negligible. 54 The institutional factors contributing to this outcome have been laid out above and described better elsewhere.
Equally important but far less examined is the Hashemite regime's portrayal of political parties and its impact on partisan activity in the country.
Producing Weak or Extreme Political Parties
In frequently deemed necessary and partisan life described as essential to democratization.
Yet political parties were consistently described as weak, incapable or extreme. Crucially, the monarchy was never described as a hindrance to democratization, but positioned instead 'at the forefront of reform.' Reforming the media and the political parties law are also essential. There is currently no space for parties to organize or recruit potential members or spread their ideologies. The people have been told to fear or ignore us. The King's vision of strong partisan life will be impossible until we are given the space to openly recruit and actively mobilize citizens, without us or them fearing repercussions.
In private conversations, active members of Jordanian political parties consistently described the numerous hindrances to the development of their organizations. The electoral law was frequently given pride of place, but the reputation of political parties, their portrayal in the media, was never far behind in their list of concerns. Participants in partisan life lacked neither agency nor opinion, merely the institutional tools, symbolic resources and social capital through which to alter the discursive status quo.
Through textbooks, speeches, and the repetition of certain tropes in widely accessible venues (radio, newspapers, television broadcasts), the monarchy has made its preferred vision of democracy, the opposition and political reform pervasive. 108 Such narratives operate as forms of power and influence in their own right, shaping political debates and sustaining the discursive conditions through which the regime bolsters its hegemony. 109 Of course, this public transcript does not tell the whole story. Despite their current predominance, the regime's preferred narratives are not ubiquitous, nor believed by all. When asked about the impact of the electoral law, patronage practices and other structural factors on Jordanian politics, one student at the University of Jordan stated:
If it were just about institutions and their manipulation, political life and opposition would look very different. We have been contesting the electoral law since 1993. The real problem is how the regime controls the conversation; this is why popular unrest rarely translates into a pro-democracy movement. 
Conclusion
In an attempt to further the post-democratization research agenda, this article has examined the complex interrelation between knowledge production, discursive practices and political outcomes. By way of semi-structured interviews with political elites, participant observation at party meetings and NGO conferences and close analysis of textbooks, speeches and official Palace documents, it dissects an all too often overlooked aspect contributing to party weakness: how the Hashemite regime's portrayal of Jordan's political parties relates to their very existence. I argue that state-sponsored articulatory practices contribute to the discrediting of potential opponents, a contingent and contested process that undermines public participation, and is by no means unique to Jordan. Far too frequently, an over-reliance on institutional approaches focused on rents, access to power and constitutional design blur micro-dynamics crucial to authoritarianism.
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Analysts commit what Antonio Gramsci regarded as the most pervasive error in politics:
equating state power with the formal institutional apparatus. 122 When academic inquiries restrict themselves to these institutional confines, scholars risk missing out on a range of subtle mechanisms and shifting techniques of governance through which authoritarian rule is crafted, resisted and reproduced. circulating representations of the nation-state and Jordanian politics. 123 They deploy their 'paradigm power' over the discursive space so as to maintain their position by making certain concepts and histories meaningful and acceptable to the citizenry. 124 When key voices position the monarchy as the source of democratic reforms and portray the organized opposition as incapable, dangerous or immature, a distinct field of politics is formed and delimited. As a result, Jordanians become less susceptible to alternative and oppositional discourses, which also become harder to formulate. Of course, no one actor can completely dominate a field of discursivity, and the Palace's preferred narratives are intermittently subject to various forms of resistance. 125 Nevertheless, the Hashemite regime can be said to have created a hegemonic formation by constructing 'not a shared ideology but a common material and meaningful framework for living through, talking about, and acting upon social orders characterized by domination.' 126 This is a subtle but crucial mechanism for the reproduction of authoritarian power. It not only ensures support and funds from foreign donors, but also generates a politics of partial dissimulation that works to induce complicity and enforce obedience amongst the citizenry. 127 It does so through repetition and calculated enforcement, draining citizens' political energies and habituating them to formulaic and self-serving rhetoric that fosters their accommodation with authoritarian power's hard realities. As Lisa Wedeen has argued in the case of the Assad cult in Syria, official rhetoric, images and narratives not only exemplify a given political order's power, they also help produce it. 128 This is why the monarchy and its allies fill, with symbolic display and rhetorical flourish, the considerable chasm between the recalcitrant authoritarian realities of contemporary
Jordan and the promise of the regime's self-proclaimed democratizing pretensions.
For monarchical rule to persist without the constant use or threat of coercion, the Hashemite regime must depend on more than brute force and institutional manipulation.
For its hegemonic practices to "work," the Palace must diffuse particular views and concepts throughout society. By partially fixing conceptions of democracy, reform and political parties, the Hashemite monarchy legitimizes certain governance techniques and practices. This is but one small part of the larger project through which ruling elites articulate different identities and subjectivities into a common project of rule. Crucially, this dynamic process cannot be fully understood without recourse to an analysis of discursive practices that remains sensitive to the institutions and relations of force that structure the field of knowledge. While it remains true that the political economy excludes the poor from prosperity, it is through close attention to the Hashemite regime's discursive practices that we can observe how they are eased out of representation. 
